H5N1 in Ohio Poultry- More Cases Coming as Ohio Swine Producers Meet to Discuss

Word from Gary Flory in the trenches and Ohio swine producers have H5N1 seminar opportunity; screening cattle and swine herds in affected areas is a BIG ask

I wanted to start this post with a LinkedIn entry form Gary Flory, a renowned world-class expert in outbreak cleaning and disinfection management in particular: LinkedIn Post Gary Flory

I just returned from a deployment to Ohio, where I was helping manage the disposal of infected carcasses, eggs, and manure from turkey and egg-laying facilities impacted by HPAI. When I arrived, there were seven confirmed cases. Now, that number has surged to nearly 50 cases—a staggering increase in just a short time.

The official confirmed count on the ODA web site Monday morning was 41, so there are likely at least another 8-9 positive cases “in the hopper” right now undergoing depopulation awaiting official NVSL confirmation. Recall that cases are diagnosed as “presumptive positive” at the Ohio NAHLN lab, allowing depopulation to begin immediately to minimize viral amplification while case confirmation takes place in Ames. We’ve also seen that the ODA puts confirmation information up on their web site much faster than NVSL updates national information. With sequence of events in mind and Gary’s report of nearly 50 cases, I expect we’ll see double digit reported cases from western Ohio again this week. I hope it doesn’t spread much wider geographically; that may depend more upon poultry industry location and density than in efforts to ramp up biosecurity. It seems this virus is having its way in poultry dense areas like this where it gains a multi-flock foothold.

Read the rest of Gary’s LinkedIn post to get the full flavor of the anguish sweeping the poultry industry in Mercer and Darke Counties Ohio (and elsewhere) right now. He goes on to provide some very valuable outbreak contingency planning suggestions for all poultry producers to consider.

A billion-dollar question remains unanswered in my mind, i.e. what is the role, if any, for other farm species as a reservoir or amplifier of this virus in poultry disaster areas like this? We already know that D1.1 is abundant in wild bird hosts in this and many other areas. We have a lot of “sporadic” D1.1 poultry outbreaks across the U.S. in the past few months. However, this is a 30-day 50-flock epizootic concentrated in 2 counties. Is wildlife pressure that much greater here, or is biosecurity lacking in a highly dense poultry production area? Or is there possibly a cattle or swine reservoir of the virus that has not yet been identified through lack of testing?

We already know the answer regarding mammalian reservoirs with the B3.13 genotype in Texas-New Mexico, Colorado, Idaho, Utah, and Colorado, where dairy cattle herds were demonstrated to be viral sinks for poultry outbreaks with the B3.13 H5N1 2.3.4.4b genotype. I have to assume that B3.13 is not involved in this outbreak, since no one at the state or national level has disclosed that to date. There have been no reports of sick dairy herds or positive bulk milk samples from Ohio or eastern Indiana, although national reporting of about anything disease-related and controversial has slowed to a crawl.

Assuming that this outbreak in poultry is exclusively D1.1 genotype, we still lack much published relevant research on H5N1 2.3.4.4b viral susceptibility in cattle and swine. ARS-NADC published data on a couple of early infection studies in swine showing limited susceptibility and onward transmission (prior to the B3.13 dairy outbreak). In addition, the Oregon detection demonstrated field infection with a D1.2 genotype. In cattle the German Loeffler Institute fatally infected cows by intramammary infusion of a European strain in a study last spring in conjunction with simultaneously studying a B3.13 intramammary infusion. However, to my knowledge, we lack data on the susceptibility of ruminants to D1.1 or any other strains besides B3.13 via non-intramammary infusion. We have shown that cattle can be infected intranasally by B3.13 in the original ARS dairy calf work, and we have PCR evidence of virus in multiple bovine tissues in early published case reports, although USDA and the industry have gone out of their way to minimize that information in their zeal to officially maintain that H5N1 is a “milk-exclusive dairy disease” in cattle.

“We have no evidence that D1.1 is infectious in cattle and pigs”, so let’s not test…that logic will work until it doesn’t. At what point will the poultry industry demand further research and negative results from nearby large cattle and swine production units in quarantine and surveillance zones? When will an unsuspected matrix positive swine sample get sequenced as a recombinant H5N2 or H5N1? Or a D1.1 positive bulk or retail milk sample shows up? Or a dead cat is documented to have been fed raw beef? Or a mysterious shipping fever necropsy case workup at a D-lab utilizes next generation sequencing and finds D1.1?

My point is that if D1.1 or its descendants can infect our red meat species, we will find it later, if not sooner. The costs and consequences from wider spread will be greater. We ought to be looking hard and hoping that it’s not a reality we need to deal with now.

I noticed that the Ohio Pork Council is at least facing the issue head-on at their annual meeting: Ohio Pork Congress set for Feb. 4-5

In addition to the Ohio Pork Council Update and the keynote presentation by Wendy’s Innovation Team, additional educational seminars and breakout sessions include:

• Biosecurity Enhancement: Rebecca Robbins, PIC

• H5N1 Influenza Panel: Anna Forseth, National Pork Producers Council; Marisa Rotolo, National Pork Board; and Andy Bowman, Ohio State University

• Ohio Department of Ag Update: Dennis Summers, State Veterinarian

• Foreign Animal Disease Response Panel: Nathan Isler, Islercrest Farms; Bethany Heitkamp, Cooper Farms; and Lucas Buehler, Four Star Veterinary Service

I’m not confident that individual swine producers/companies are ready to fall on their swords for widespread swine influenza surveillance in high-risk areas, but they are at least discussing the issues at their state meetings. I participated in a swine veterinarians’ influenza committee call last Friday, most of which was proprietary. I think the relevant swine organizations truly understand the necessity of supporting influenza surveillance; however, private representative on the call still related examples of individual owner hesitation to allow sample genotyping in higher risk H5N1 situations.

Individual veterinarians walk a very lonely line in counselling clients in these circumstances. We all face choices in conscience at points in our lives; I don’t pretend to tell either the owner or the veterinarian what their choice must be because these are difficult ethical and economic decisions for both swine and cattle owners and the health professionals who advise them.

Poultry flock owners receive basic federal compensation for flock destruction, clean-up and disinfection upon confirmation of infection. Swine and cattle herd owners might receive similar reimbursement if depopulations were necessary. However, no level of federal compensation comes close to covering all the ongoing costs for loss of business continuity involved with shutting down and restocking production facilities.

It’s a “no-brainer” for me and a whole host of One Health “experts” to insist that this dynamic H5N1 virus rapidly adapting to mammalian infections must be monitored in our domestic livestock populations for prudent assessment of ongoing risk. However, let’s at least put ourselves in the shoes of our livestock production colleagues as we make that request. Agriculture’s poultry segment is facing the reality of this viral disaster currently. Their very real financial and emotional pain sharpens the focus on the potential stakes placed upon the red meat and dairy segments as they are asked to intensify testing to potentially face the very same circumstances.

Just remember that all the sympathy and good will for producers dealing with the economics of H5N1 risks in production agriculture will wither if or when this virus graduates from animals into a widespread human pandemic. At that point any second guessing about the necessity for testing pigs and cattle in high-risk infected poultry areas will disappear. How much do we want to wager that this virus remains relatively rare and mild in people?

John