On the Road Early This Week

Some New Papers Reviewed in Avian Flu Diary (Michael Coston) in My Absence

With warm weather and the Easter holiday I didn’t find time to put together a full column this weekend; news was scarce in any event. Michael Coston in Avian Flu Diary posted a couple of columns reemphasizing the ongoing broadening risk that H5N1 brings to our entire avian and mammalian ecosystem world-wide. We were shocked a year ago to find H5N1 in dairy cattle, a domestic mammalian species. What a difference a year has made!

The first article documents viral detection of multiple high path (including H52.3.4.4b) and low path influenza strains in pigeons, certainly a widespread biosecurity risk on multiple farms and in cities worldwide:

Avian Flu Diary: Viruses: Detection of Avian Influenza Virus in Pigeons

…Combined with the aforementioned statistical data on pigeon AIV, pigeons can serve as “virus blenders” capable of simultaneous infection with multiple AIV subtypes. Such mixed infections significantly promote genetic recombination, leading to the emergence of novel strains and increasing pandemic risks.

A second article is a good historical review of the widening scope of the H5 panzootic, and the role of wild birds in its spread:

The Role of Wild Birds in the Global Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5 Panzootic

I found the closing statements by Mike compelling:

…Nearly two years ago, in Avian Flu's New Normal: When the Extraordinary Becomes Ordinary, I wrote about the numbing effect that comes with the constant barrage of HPAI H5 reports from around the world.

Events that were nearly unthinkable four years ago (e.g. Repeated trans-Atlantic introduction of avian flu from Europe, the spread of HPAI H5 across the length of South America, numerous spillovers of H5 into mammalian species, and > 77 human cases in the U.S.) have somehow become routine.

While the future course and impact of HPAI H5 remains unknown, HPAI's recent trajectory represents an escalation of its threat level, and we'd do well to take that seriously.

It’s particularly appalling to me that as the threat level continues to expand, our current federal leadership is actively CUTTNG staff and financial support that support active surveillance and confirmatory testing for human spillover cases. Missing early spillover cases will not stop a pandemic. It will only delay its recognition and slow vaccine development, unless HS Secretary Kennedy’s plan is to “let it rip” in people to identify survivors, as he has suggested with hens?? If so, avoiding the effects of “alleged autism” will be the least of his concerns…

It’s really hard to conceive that any HHS leader would be taking any steps to intentionally hamstring federal reporting of H5N1 spillover cases, but those rumors are out there…do others have independent confirmation of that? I can only hope that state public and animal health departments are fulfilling their One Health missions to the best of their ability in any case.

I’m attending the North Carolina Food Animal Initiative: HPAI Forum in Durham NC tomorrow. I look forward to many good interactions there.

John